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INTRODUCTION 
Final-offer arbitration limits an arbitrator to choosing a 
final offer made by one of the parties involved in an 
arbitration proceeding.1 Conventional arbitration, on the 
other hand, allows an arbitrator to make an unrestricted 
settlement choice without the prior submission of offers by the 
disputants.2 
The most discussed use of final-offer arbitration is its 
application in Major League Baseball (“MLB”) salary 
 
 1. The process was first proposed by Carl Stevens in 1966. See Carl Stevens, Is 
Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining?, 5 INDUS. REL. 38 (1966).  
 2. D.L. Dickinson, A comparison of conventional, final-offer and “combined” 
arbitration for dispute resolution, 57 INDUS.& LAB. REL. REV. 288, 289 (2004).  
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arbitration. Because of its long-term presence and apparent 
success, final-offer arbitration is sometimes referred to as 
“Baseball Arbitration.”3 Major League Baseball is unique in 
that final-offer arbitration is used solely to select a specific 
salary that is then inserted into a players existing contract.4  
But final-offer arbitration has also been utilized in other 
contexts, such as public employment, a context in which final-
offer arbitration is sometimes codified to resolve bargaining 
impasses.5 Although state statutes governing arbitration may 
share certain goals, the execution of these public employment 
statutes is inconsistent.  
Final-offer arbitration is typically utilized in “interest” 
arbitration. Interest arbitration involves submitting disputes 
that arise from a disagreement over what terms or conditions 
to include in an agreement. Public employment interest 
arbitration involves the arbitration of disputed terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement, such as wages or health 
insurance benefits. Salary arbitration in MLB is a unique 
form of interest arbitration in that it deals with a player’s 
individual contract, rather than the terms of the league’s 
collective bargaining agreement. This paper will analyze 
final-offer interest arbitration in labor law in an effort to 
understand the statutory inconsistencies and to explore how 
and when final-offer arbitration may be best utilized. 
Part II of this paper will discuss the theories underlying 
final-offer arbitration and how these theories have led to the 
use of such arbitration in both private and public sector labor 
law. In order to determine the contexts in which final-offer 
arbitration could be implemented, as well as the appropriate 
procedural variation, this section will analyze several 
agreements and statutes that have used or considered such 
 
 3. See ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., ARBITRATION 937 (2006). 
 4. See MLB COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. VI (2007-2011) 
[hereinafter MLB AGREEMENT], available at 
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf. 
 5. Iowa and Washington have mandatory final-offer arbitration statutes. IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 20.22 (Lexis 2008). WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 35.21.779 (Lexis 2008). 
Other states have mandatory final-offer arbitration statutes if requested by one of the 
parties. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958-B(5-A) (Lexis 2008). ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
TIT. 26 § 965 (Lexis 2008). CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5-276a(c) (Lexis 2008). MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 179A.16 (Subd. 7) (Lexis 2008). OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. § 51-108(4) (Lexis 2008), 
PA. STAT. ANN. § 11-1122-A (Lexis 2008), MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. 423.238 (Lexis 
2008), WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(4)(b) (Lexis 2008), N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16 (2009). ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN., 5 ILCS 315/14 (2009).  
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arbitration. Additionally, Part II will address the interest 
arbitration mandate of the proposed Employee Free Choice 
Act and the suitability of final-offer arbitration in this 
context. 
Part III examines which factors a final-offer arbitrator 
should be permitted to consider in making his or her 
determination. Collective bargaining agreements and final-
offer arbitration statutes specifically dictate what an 
arbitrator may consider in making his or her decision, and 
some go as far as excluding specific criteria. The permitted 
criteria are formulated to mimic the bargaining market 
between the two parties in order to establish market value. 
With that in mind, Part III will analyze how this list of 
criteria should be structured in a final-offer setting. 
II. IN WHAT CONTEXTS IS FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION MOST 
APPROPRIATE? 
A. The Theory Behind Final-Offer Arbitration 
In order to understand the theory behind final-offer 
arbitration, it is important to first look at the criticisms of 
conventional arbitration. It is argued that conventional 
arbitrators often “split the difference” between each party’s 
position.6 Although the idea of a compromise itself may be 
fair, the existence of a compromise can be seen as an obstacle 
to good-faith bargaining, based on the assumption that these 
compromises cause a “chilling” or “freezing” effect on 
negotiations.7 Because parties may believe that the arbitrator 
will split the difference, they may be less willing to make 
concessions and more likely to take extreme positions so that 
the arbitral “compromise” will be skewed in their favor. 
Whether a conventional arbitrator actually splits the 
difference has little impact on how the parties formulate their 
offers. What is most important is that parties who expect 
compromise tend to extend extreme offers and, as a result, fail 
to reach a middle ground in pre-arbitration settlement 
discussions. This would lead to more bargaining impasses 
and, consequently, more arbitration hearings.  
 
 6. See RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 936. 
 7. Peter Feuille, Final Offer Arbitration and the Chilling Effect, 14 INDUS. REL. 
302, 304 (1975). 
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The goal of final-offer arbitration is to counteract this 
chilling effect.8 The theory is that by doing so, final-offer 
arbitration promotes good faith bargaining and pre-hearing 
settlement.9 When an arbitrator’s discretion is limited to a 
choice between two final offers, each party may worry that if 
his or her final offer is too extreme, an arbitrator will choose 
the final offer of the opposing party. As a result, it is to the 
strategic advantage of each party to present a final offer that 
is closer to the middle than the opposition’s offer, since that 
position should win out in arbitration. When each party feels 
pressured to make a more reasonable offer, the parties are 
brought together toward a middle ground, which promotes 
settlement prior to an arbitration hearing. The idea of final-
offer arbitration is to avoid arbitral hearings altogether in 
favor of an efficient, negotiated resolution. Although efficiency 
may not necessarily be the stated priority of arbitration 
generally, it is unequivocally the goal of final-offer 
arbitration.  
Although the purpose of final-offer arbitration is to avoid 
an arbitration hearing, it is the presence of the final-offer 
arbitration process that promotes good-faith bargaining and 
drives the negotiations toward settlement, not the 
negotiations themselves. Although the pre-hearing settlement 
may be similar to the arbitrator’s ultimate decision, this is not 
a zero-sum game. The parties not only save the time and 
expense of a hearing, but also seek a compromise in order to 
prevent the arbitrator from selecting the other party’s final 
offer. The parties also benefit from avoiding the adversarial 
nature of a lengthy hearing. 
Professor Roger Abrams, referring to his experience as a 
baseball arbitrator, notes that he looked for fair market value; 
whichever offer was closest to his idea of market value would 
win.10 In final-offer salary arbitration, the parties know that 
one side might receive an award that is greater than market 
value while the other party might receive below market value. 
Thus, for risk-averse parties, there is an incentive to 
compromise. Final-offer arbitration may be problematic if 
both parties present unreasonable offers, but the incentive to 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. ROGER ABRAMS, THE MONEY PITCH: BASEBALL FREE AGENCY AND SALARY 
ARBITRATION 155 (2000). 
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extend a more reasonable offer typically outweighs the risk 
associated with losing to an “unreasonable” offer. As Professor 
Abrams noted, “[w]inning means being more reasonable, 
which is the key that unlocks the door to settlement.”11 
Major League Baseball’s salary arbitration is a highly 
successful example of the sought-after benefits associated 
with final-offer arbitration. In the 2009 salary arbitration 
season,12 111 players filed for arbitration, 46 players 
exchanged numbers with their respective teams, and only 
three of these players continued to a hearing.13 The question 
remains whether MLB’s success with final-offer arbitration is 
an anomaly. How is final-offer arbitration applied in public 
employment? Is its application appropriate? Can the process 
be extended to other contexts that could benefit from the 
advantages of final-offer arbitration? The sections that follow 
will analyze these questions in an effort to determine the 
most appropriate contexts for the use of final-offer arbitration. 
B. Major League Baseball: Final-Offer Salary Arbitration 
Major League Baseball’s collective bargaining process 
utilizes final-offer arbitration for one issue only: determining 
a player’s salary within the parameters of his existing 
contract.14 A player is eligible for arbitration after completing 
three to six years15 of major league service.16 After three 
 
 11. Id. at 153. 
 12. Major League Baseball’s “salary arbitration season” occurs in January and 
February. Players file for arbitration in early to mid-January and negotiate with their 
organization up until the potential hearings which take place between February 1st and 
February 20th. In 2009, players filed for arbitration by January 15th and all hearings 
were completed on February 20th as required by the league’s collective bargaining 
agreement. MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. VI, §  (f)(5).  
 13. Maury Brown, 2009 MLB Salary Arbitration Vital Statistics, THE BIZ OF 
BASEBALL, Feb. 20, 2009, 
http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2974:2009-
mlb-salary-arbitration-vital-stats&catid=66:free-agnecy-and-trades&Itemid=153. 
 14. Sports unions are run much differently than other labor unions. In labor law, 
by virtue of Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, the union is entitled to 
eliminate all individual employee bargaining. In sports, however, individual athletes 
may contract within the parameters of the collective bargaining agreement. PAUL C. 
WEILER AND GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 307 (3d ed. 2004).   
 15. See MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at (f)(1).  
 16. A player is also eligible for arbitration if he is what is known as a “Super Two.” 
A Super Two is a player who has only two years of Major League experience but (a) has 
accumulated at least eighty-six days of service during the immediately preceding 
season; and (b) ranks in the top 17% in total service in the class of players who have 
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years, a player may invoke arbitration to determine his salary 
but is not permitted to look for employment elsewhere. After 
six years in the major leagues, a player is eligible for free 
agency.17 Salary arbitration was originally instituted in MLB 
in 1974 to protect players from the economic effects of the 
controversial “reserve clause.” This clause gave a team the 
right to retain a player at the contract of the team’s choosing 
for the player’s entire career.18 The reserve clause was 
essentially eliminated, for players in the league for six years, 
with the implementation of free agency in 1976. Thus, the 
goal of modern MLB arbitration is to adjust a player’s market 
value while allowing a team to retain a player for at least six 
years. 
Major League Baseball uses final-offer arbitration to avoid 
arbitration proceedings and to promote settlement. As noted 
in the introduction, in this endeavor, the process is successful 
in its ability to achieve pre-hearing settlements.19 In addition 
to the direct benefits of final-offer arbitration, there are other 
aspects of MLB’s final-offer salary arbitration that make 
settlement more attractive than an arbitration proceeding.  
For one, if the player and the owner manage to settle on a 
salary figure before the hearing, they can be creative in 
designing a compensation package. A settlement may include 
bonuses, a no-trade clause, or a multi-year contract, among 
other perks.  Traditionally, baseball arbitration results in 
players receiving one-year contracts.  However, in 2009, 
fifteen players who filed for arbitration received multi-year 
contracts in lieu of the one-year contract (with all the terms of 
their existing contract) that traditionally results from 
entering into baseball arbitration.20 Additionally, there is the 
 
two years of service. Id. 
 17. Id. at art. XX, § (b)(1). 
 18. See ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 143. 
 19. As noted in the Introduction, only three players went through arbitration in 
2009, as opposed to the 108 players who settled. See supra note 13. This is consistent 
with the settlement rates of the last few years. In 2008, 110 players filed for arbitration 
and only eight entered into arbitration proceedings. In 2007, seven players went 
through arbitration while 158 players filed. Maury Brown, Salary Arbitration Filings, 
THE BIZ OF BASEBALL, Nov. 30, 2006, 
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=492&Ite
mid=65. Maury Brown, Arbitration Scorecard, THE BIZ OF BASEBALL, Feb. 10, 2007,  
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=719&Ite
mid=116. 
 20. Id. See also MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. VI, § (f)(6).  
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invaluable incentive of maintaining a congenial relationship 
between the player and management. In an arbitration 
proceeding, the player would have to witness his team’s 
management questioning his value to the team. As the player 
likely will remain on the team,21 preserving a good 
relationship is of great importance.  
When teams and players cannot settle their differences 
privately, baseball’s final-offer salary arbitration can provide 
a quick, informal, final, and binding resolution to the 
dispute.22 Appeals and player holdouts are both prohibited 
under baseball arbitration.23 When an arbitrator has little 
discretion and must choose between two offers with no 
arbitral explanation permitted, an appeal makes little sense, 
a benefit that affirms the finality of baseball’s final-offer 
arbitration process.  
C. The National Hockey League: Conventional Salary 
Arbitration 
Like MLB, the National Hockey League (“NHL”) offers 
salary arbitration. However, the NHL, whose salary 
 
 21. A player will remain on the team unless he is traded, which typically occurs 
when a small-market team cannot afford to give the player the raise he is due to receive 
during the arbitration process. Additionally, a team may release a player (who has 
received an arbitration award) during Spring Training. If the player is released more 
than sixteen days before the beginning of the season, the team is responsible for thirty 
days of the arbitration award. MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. IX. If the player 
is released within sixteen days, the team is then responsible for forty-five days of the 
salary. Id. If the player remains with the team on Opening Day, however, the team is 
responsible for the full award. Id.  
  It could be argued that because players may be released, salary arbitration 
does not sufficiently protect players. However, if the players are released they are 
entitled to at least thirty days’ salary. This would account for about one-sixth of an 
entire season’s salary. For example, if a player is rewarded $6 million at arbitration 
and is released at the start of spring training, he is entitled to $1 million. Further, 
because his market value has been set by an arbitrator, the player will likely be able to 
collect at least $5 million on the open market (with almost a full month before the start 
of the season). Unless the arbitrator greatly misinterpreted the market he is supposed 
to approximate, the player should be able to receive a sufficient award from another 
team. Organizations are also deterred from releasing a player who has received an 
arbitration award. A team would prefer to trade a player, pay nothing, and receive at 
least some value rather than release the player and be responsible for one-sixth of the 
award.  It is rare that a player is released after an arbitration award. It is more 
common for a team to trade such a player. 
 22. See ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 146. 
 23. Id. at 147. See also MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. VI. 
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arbitration process was implemented in 1970,24 uses 
conventional salary arbitration rather than final-offer salary 
arbitration. Professor Abrams notes that, in hockey, an 
arbitrator is almost certain to name a compensation figure 
falling between the two offers presented by each side.25 In 
2008, sixteen players filed for arbitration and two 
participated in hearings.26 In 2007, thirty players filed for 
arbitration and seven players entered into hearings.27 As of 
2004, twenty-eight percent of NHL filings proceeded to 
arbitration.28 As these statistics illustrate, the MLB is 
generally more successful than the NHL in reaching pre-
hearing settlements.29 
Further, unlike in MLB, the salary arbitration process in 
the NHL is not always binding. A team can refuse to 
implement (“walk away” from) an arbitrator’s award if a 
player has initiated the proceeding.30 Therefore, there is less 
incentive for an NHL player to forego settlement and risk 
going to a hearing and greater incentive for a team to risk an 
award from which they can simply walk away.  
In 2004, NHL team owners, in an attempt to control 
increased wages, challenged the use of conventional salary 
arbitration and championed for final-offer arbitration to be 
included in the league’s collective bargaining agreement.31 
The players’ association considered including final-offer 
arbitration to appease the owners.32 The owners, however, 
 
 24. See ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 146. 
 25. Id. (noting that, “[i]n fact, [a hockey arbitrator] is almost certain to name a 
compensation figure between the two extremes presented by each side.”). 
 26. 2008 Salary Arbitration Filings, CBSSPORTS.COM, June 27, 2008, 
http://www.cbssports.com/nhl/story/10879613. 
 27. NHL Salary Arbitration, 2007 Player Arbitration List, SPORTS CITY, 
http://www.sportscity.com/NHL/Salary-Arbitration. 
 28. Stephen M. Yoost, The National Hockey League and Salary Arbitration: Time 
for a Line Change, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 485, 519 (2006). 
 29. Based on the figures in this paragraph, when the NHL did not have a salary 
cap, its settlement rate was 72%. In 2008, the rate was 87.5% (in a very small sample 
size of only sixteen filings) and in 2007, the rate was 76.7%. In 2009, Major League 
Baseball’s settlement rate was 97.3% (108 settlements out of 111 filings). This number 
is consistent with the history of Major League Baseball salary arbitration.  
 30. NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, § 12.10, available at 
http://www.nhlpa.com/CBA/index.asp (providing for walk-away rights for player-elected 
salary arbitration).  
 31. Arbitration, CBC SPORTS, 
http://www.cbc.ca/sports/indepth/cba/issues/arbitration.html.  
 32. Larry Brooks, Union, NHL set to talk, N.Y. POST, Dec. 9, 2004, available at 
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/nypost/access/759054421.html?dids=759054421:759054421
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wanted final-offer arbitration for the wrong reasons. With 
little genuine interest in promoting settlement, the owners 
believed that final-offer arbitration would control the increase 
of salaries. Despite the discussion, the owners and the 
players’ association opted to keep conventional arbitration 
and instead instituted a hard salary cap33 that, for better or 
worse, may make salary arbitration obsolete in the NHL.34  
D. Procedural Variations of Final-Offer Arbitration  
In a field where final-offer arbitration is appropriate, an 
analysis should also include a discussion of which procedural 
variation of final-offer arbitration should be applied. MLB and 
the NHL limit their final-offer arbitration to disputes of one 
specific issue (salary), but final-offer arbitration is also used 
in contexts where there are a number of issues in dispute 
(such as public employment interest arbitration).  When there 
are multiple issues involved, they may be approached with 
“package” or “issue-by-issue” final-offer arbitration.35  Package 
final-offer arbitration involves each party’s submitting his or 
her final offer in the form of a package that addresses all 
disputed issues.36 Instead of deciding each issue separately, 
an arbitrator will select the more reasonable package. In 
contrast, issue-by-issue final-offer arbitration allows each 
party to submit an offer as to each disputed issue.37 An 
arbitrator will then choose the more reasonable offer for each 
disputed issue. Because of the numerous issues involved in 
negotiating collective bargaining agreements, public 
 
&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Dec+9%2C+2004&author=LARRY+
BROOKS&pub=New+York+Post&edition=&startpage=104&desc=UNION%2C+NHL+S
ET+TO+TALK. 
 33. A “hard salary cap” means that teams may not go above the salary cap for any 
reason. The NFL and NHL currently have hard salary caps. The NBA, on the other 
hand, utilizes a soft salary cap. A “soft salary cap” allows teams to exceed the salary cap 
under certain circumstances. For example, NBA teams are allowed to spend above the 
salary cap to retain their own players.  This is known as the “Larry Bird Exception.” 
Major League Baseball has no salary cap. Yoost, supra note 28, at 523-24. 
 34. With a hard salary cap, there is less incentive for a player to enter salary 
arbitration. With no salary cap, there is no limit to how high a salary can go. For 
example, in 2004 (prior to the introduction of a hard salary cap), 66 players filed for 
arbitration.  Yoost, supra note 28, at 485. As mentioned above, under a hard salary cap, 
only 16 players filed in 2008 down from 30 in 2007.   
 35. See RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 938. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
TULIS_FORMATTED 1/19/2010  3:45 PM 
2010] Final-Offer Arbitration 95 
employment interest arbitration statutes typically codify 
which procedural variation will be used: package or issue-by-
issue. 
E.  Final-Offer Interest Arbitration of Collective Bargaining 
Impasses 
Major League Baseball’s collective bargaining agreement 
uses final-offer arbitration as a contractual tool to promote 
settlement and to avoid salary arbitration hearings. In the 
context of public employment, however, final-offer arbitration 
is primarily used to resolve impasses regarding the terms of 
new collective bargaining agreements between a state or local 
government and a union representing its public employees.38 
Although MLB uses final-offer arbitration within its collective 
bargaining agreement solely to resolve the issue of a player’s 
salary, state governments typically use the process to resolve 
bargaining impasses on a number of issues. Despite this key 
difference in execution, the theories behind the use of final-
offer arbitration are similar.   
Since states are reluctant to grant public employees the 
right to strike, some states codify third-party procedures, such 
as interest arbitration, to provide for an efficient resolution. 
Within specific interest arbitration statutes, some states 
expressly indicate what type of arbitration will be employed, 
typically variations of final-offer or conventional arbitration, 
while other states opt to leave this open.39 A state also may 
codify which types of disputed issues are to be resolved by 
each process. Interest arbitration, as a result of the pending 
 
 38. Upon reaching impasse, Iowa provides for final-offer arbitration for both 
economic and non-economic issues on an issue-by-issue basis. IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22. 
In Maine, final-offer arbitration is used under the Maine Agriculture Marketing and 
Bargaining Act.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958-B(5-A). Connecticut offers final-
offer arbitration for all state employees upon impasse on an issue-by-issue basis. CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. 5-276a(c).Minnesota offers final-offer arbitration on an issue-by-issue 
basis for “principals” and “assistant principals,” and offers final-offer arbitration on an 
issue-by-issue or package basis otherwise. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.16 (Subd. 7).Other 
states using final-offer arbitration for labor disputes include Oklahoma, Pennsylvania 
and Washington. OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. § 51-108(4); PA. STAT. ANN. § 11-1122-A; WASH. 
REV. CODE. ANN. § 35.21.779. Michigan, Wisconsin and New Jersey allow final-offer 
arbitration for public labor disputes involving firemen and policemen. MICH. COMP. 
LAWS. ANN. 423.238; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(4)(b);N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16.  
 39. In New Jersey, for example, one can choose between variations of final-offer 
arbitration and conventional arbitration instead of requiring one form. N.J. STAT. § 
34:13A-16.  
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Employee Free Choice Act, may also be utilized outside of the 
public employment field. 
 1.Pending Legislation: The Employee Free Choice Act’s 
Interest Arbitration Requirement 
The Employee Free Choice Act, currently before Congress, 
would “amend the National Labor Relations Act to establish 
an efficient system to enable employees to join, or assist labor 
organizations, to provide for mandatory injunctions for unfair 
labor practices during organizing efforts, and for other 
purposes.”40 The Act would also impose a system of 
mandatory, binding interest arbitration between management 
and a newly-certified union who cannot settle on the terms of 
their first collective bargaining agreement. Prior to such 
arbitration, the parties would be required to undergo 
mediation.41 This legislation would apply to unions that 
obtain recognition under the NLRA and would not apply to 
state or federal government employees. However, in the 
unlikely event that this Act is passed,42 a debate between 
final-offer and conventional interest arbitration is likely to 
follow. In light of this pending legislation, it is useful to 
analyze state statutes that utilize final-offer interest 
arbitration. Below are examples of states that have codified 
final-offer interest arbitration.  
 
 40. Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.R.800. (Last Visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 41. Id. at § 3. 
 42. At this point, it is unlikely the bill will be passed in the near future. The Act is 
often criticized and has lost support in the past year.  Arlen Specter, whose support is 
considered critical to the bill’s passage, announced recently that he opposed the 
legislation. Specter noted: “The problems of the recession make this a particularly bad 
time to enact Employee Free Choice legislation….If efforts are unsuccessful to give 
labor sufficient bargaining power through amendments to the NLRA, then I would be 
willing to reconsider Employees’ Free Choice legislation when the economy returns to 
normalcy.” Arlen Specter opposes Employee Free Choice Act, WASH. BUS. J., Mar. 25, 
2009, available at 
http://washington.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/2009/03/23/daily59.html.  
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2. State Statutes that Codify Final-Offer Interest 
Arbitration 
 a. Maine 
Maine’s Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act 
governs private relationships, although, due to National 
Labor Relations Act preemption, reaches only those private 
employers who do not fall within the NLRA. Maine requires 
binding final-offer interest arbitration (after mandatory 
mediation) in collective bargaining disputes between 
agricultural “handlers” and “qualified associations.”43 The 
statute defines “handlers” as agricultural employers 
throughout the various stages of a given agricultural 
process.44 “Qualified associations” include any association 
certified to bargain on behalf of a group of producers.45  This is 
the type of private impasse that the Employee Free Choice 
Act would cover if the union (“qualified association”) were 
certified under the NLRA and the Act’s proposed card check 
system.46   
Prior to 1987, Maine’s Act was limited to nonbinding final-
offer arbitration within the potato industry.47 In 1987, in an 
effort to promote good-faith bargaining and settlement (a 
stated goal of the section), Maine amended the Act by 
providing for mandatory mediation followed by binding final-
offer arbitration for all disputes involving handlers and 
qualified associations.48 The state likely sought to codify a 
 
 43. ME. REV.STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958. 
 44. Id. at § 1955(3). “Handler” refers to any person engaged in the business or 
practice of: A. Acquiring agricultural products  from producers or associations of 
producers for processing or sale; B. Grading, packaging, handling, storing, or processing 
agricultural products received from producers or associations of producers; C. 
Contracting or negotiating contracts or other arrangements, written or oral, with or on 
behalf of producers or associations of producers with respect to production or marketing 
of any agricultural product; or D. Acting as an agent or broker for a handler in the 
performance of any function or act specified in paragraph A,B or C. 
 45. Id. at §§ 1955(5)-(6), 1957. 
 46. The Employee Free Choice Act allows for union certification if the majority of 
employees have signed authorization cards designating the union as the employees’ 
bargaining representative. Employee Free Choice Act § 2(a)(6). The current system 
requires that the union obtain a majority through secret ballot elections to achieve 
certification. 
 47. ME. REV.STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958-A (repealed, 1987). 
 48. ME. REV.STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958. See also Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Hanson, 675 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Me. 1987).  
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binding alternative to strikes in these negotiations because an 
agricultural work stoppage would hurt the welfare of the 
state. When appropriate, public policy may prompt a state to 
take steps to protect against strikes in an important industry. 
In this instance, Maine chose final-offer arbitration to serve 
that end. 
 b. Public Employment State Statutes: Firemen and 
Policemen 
Final-offer statutes can address a variety of relationships, 
ranging from broad labor relationships49 to narrow labor 
relationships.50 A narrow labor relationship codified in the 
respective statutes of New Jersey, Michigan, and Wisconsin is 
the bargaining relationship between public fire and police 
departments and their respective employee bargaining 
units.51 In these states, statutory public policy prohibits 
policemen and firemen from striking.52 This constraint is 
common for public employees involved in public safety or 
other essential services. Because firemen and policemen are 
prohibited from striking, Michigan’s final-offer statute notes 
that public policy requires an “alternate, expeditious, effective 
and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes” to 
maintain the efficient operation of each department.53  This 
policy complements the advantages of final-offer arbitration. 
Final-offer arbitration, in this context, can be included in a 
statutory system that prevents potentially harmful wildcat 
strikes.54 For these reasons, in public employment, the need 
for procedural efficiency, good-faith bargaining, and a pre-
hearing settlement have prompted some states to incorporate 
 
 49. In Connecticut, final-offer arbitration is used for all “state employees.” CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. 5-276a.  
 50. Maine’s use of final-offer arbitration is geared toward narrow labor 
relationships. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958-B(5-A).  
 51. See supra note 38. The respective statutes of Michigan, Wisconsin and New 
Jersey allow for final-offer arbitration for public labor disputes involving firemen and 
policemen. 
 52. N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-14 (Lexis 2009). MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. 423.231 (Lexis 
2008). WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (Lexis 2008). 
 53. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. 423.231.  
 54. A “wildcat strike” is a strike “that is not authorized by the labor union to which 
the employees belong.” A wildcat strike includes strikes that are not permitted under 
state statute.  See Answers.com, Wildcat Strike, http://www.answers.com/topic/wildcat-
strike (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). 
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final-offer arbitration.  
 i.  New Jersey 
In New Jersey, Section 16 of the Employer-Employee 
Relations Act is unique in that it offers six variations of 
arbitration from which parties may choose.55 The section 
allows for conventional arbitration and five forms of final-
offer arbitration.56 Among these final-offer options are 
package and issue-by-issue final-offer arbitration,57 as well as 
variations of these methods in which the arbitrator may 
utilize a third offer: a fact-finder’s recommendation on the 
respective issue or package.58 Including a fact-finder 
recommendation seems counterintuitive to the underlying 
theory that final-offer arbitration facilitates settlement by 
bringing the parties’ respective offers closer together. If the 
parties are concerned with the fact-finder’s determination, 
they may not present reasonable offers if they know that the 
fact-finder will determine the most reasonable offer or 
compromise. This may prevent the parties from reaching a 
middle ground. A fifth final-offer option distinguishes between 
economic and non-economic issues.59 For economic issues, the 
statute suggests package final-offer arbitration.60 For non-
economic issues, the statute suggests issue-by-issue final-offer 
arbitration.61  
The statute provides that if the parties cannot agree on a 
type of arbitration, conventional arbitration will be the 
default option.62 Prior to 1995, however, the default was the 
final-offer arbitration option that distinguished between 
economic and non-economic issues.63 This change was likely 
the result of a 1992 legislative proposal that sought to switch 
the statute entirely to conventional arbitration.64 While the 
legislation did not pass, the statute was amended to make 
 
 55. Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16 (C) (Lexis 2009).  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at (2), (3). 
 58. Id. at (4), (5). 
 59. Id. at (6). 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16(D)(2) (Lexis 2009).  
 63. Sen. Robert J. Martin, Fixing the Fiscal Police and Firetrap: A Critique of New 
Jersey’s Compulsory Interest Arbitration Act, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 59, 77 (1993).  
 64. 80 N.J. LEGIS. INDEX NO. 2, at A-1059(1)(c)(1) (March 2, 1992). 
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conventional arbitration the default with each of the final-
offer arbitration options remaining in the statute should the 
parties opt to use one of these options. 
In 1999, a study in the Journal of Collective Negotiations 
analyzed the effect of New Jersey’s switch to conventional 
arbitration.  The researchers hoped to demonstrate that final-
offer arbitration reduces the chilling effect of conventional 
arbitration.65 The study found that in 1995, when the default 
option was final-offer arbitration, the average “difference” 
between firemen unions and municipality wage and benefit 
offers was 29%.66 In 1997, the first full year with conventional 
arbitration as the default option, this spread increased to 
44%.67 Additionally, a 1980 survey, while far from 
contemporary data, concluded that final-offer arbitration in 
New Jersey was: 
working reasonably well toward providing finality in police and 
firefighter impasses and preventing strikes. Moreover, it seems to 
appeal to the parties, and experience to date suggests that final-
offer arbitration, as compared to conventional arbitration, can 
increase the probability of negotiated settlements by exerting a 
centripetal force on the parties to move toward a middle ground.68  
 ii. Michigan and Wisconsin 
Similar to one of New Jersey’s options, Michigan’s statute 
distinguishes between economic and non-economic issues in 
arbitration. Economic issues include wages, vacations, 
insurance, and other economic benefits. Non-economic issues 
include, for example, whether police officers should be 
permitted to carry guns while off-duty. Michigan mandates 
final-offer arbitration for exclusively economic issues in 
disputes involving police and fire departments.69  This is most 
likely because there is a greater risk of arbitral compromise of 
economic issues. When there is a risk of compromise, final-
offer arbitration works to counter the “chilled” negotiations 
 
 65. Greg Stokes, Solomon’s wisdom: An early analysis of the effects of the police and 
fire interest arbitration reform act in New Jersey, 28 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 219, 
231 (1999). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Joan Weitzman & John M. Stochaj, Attitudes of Arbitrators Toward Final-Offer 
Arbitration in New Jersey, 35 ARB. J. 25, 33 (1980). 
 69. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. 423.238. 
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associated with that risk. In Michigan, the arbitration panel 
identifies the economic issues and directs each party to 
submit their final offer for each issue.70 Unlike New Jersey, 
Michigan mandates final-offer arbitration on an issue-by-
issue basis.71 New Jersey, as discussed above, recommends 
package final-offer arbitration of economic issues.  
Unless the parties agree otherwise, Wisconsin mandates 
that package final-offer arbitration be used once an 
investigator finds the parties to be at an impasse.72 Wisconsin 
does not distinguish between economic and non-economic 
issues. Much like the underlying purpose of final-offer 
arbitration in MLB, the stated purpose of Wisconsin’s statute 
is to induce the parties to bargain in good faith in order to 
reach an agreement, or to at least narrow the differences 
between the parties to the greatest extent possible.73 
Although New Jersey, Wisconsin, and Michigan utilize 
final-offer interest arbitration to accomplish similar objectives 
in the same narrow context, the execution of these statutes is 
inconsistent. Questions remain as to whether this 
inconsistency can be resolved, if it needs to be resolved, and if 
there is one ideal way to implement final-offer arbitration. 
F. What do Major League Baseball salary arbitration and 
public employment interest arbitration have in common? 
While comparing the labor situation of MLB players to 
that of state employees may seem problematic, the nature of 
their relationships with their respective employers is similar 
and may help to determine why final-offer arbitration is 
utilized in such narrow contexts. Final-offer arbitration may 
serve two functions. First, as previously discussed, it is a 
technique that promotes pre-hearing settlement. Second, it is 
a process for fixing market value when the parties have no 
other way to do so, while avoiding the repercussions of an 
adversarial arbitration proceeding.  In MLB and public 
employment, final-offer arbitration serves both of these 
functions.  In public employment, state employees must 
bargain exclusively with the state and some employees are 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(4)(b). 
 73. La Crosse Prof’l Police Ass’n v. City of La Crosse, 212 Wis. 2d 90, 102 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1997). 
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prohibited from striking. These state employees do not have 
the benefit of their employment market and arbitration is a 
tool to fix market value when the market is otherwise 
unavailable. In MLB salary arbitration, players must bargain 
exclusively with their organization because players are 
“reserved” for six years. Both MLB players and state 
employees are “locked in” a bargaining relationship with one 
employer. The mandatory nature of these bargaining 
relationships makes final-offer arbitration a useful tool in 
mimicking an otherwise unavailable market.  
Arbitration is often used to establish market value in a 
bargaining relationship when there is no other method to 
determine market value. Because MLB players and state 
employees may lack both economic leverage and an 
alternative to bargaining with their employers, arbitration 
allows their market value to be set by a third party.  Final-
offer arbitration, as opposed to conventional arbitration, 
allows the parties to set market value themselves in pre-
hearing negotiations with the looming arbitration as the 
motivating factor in reaching settlements. This would allow 
the “locked in” parties to preserve a congenial relationship 
despite the adversarial aspects of arbitration being a 
necessary aspect of the parties’ bargaining relationship. 
It is important to note, however, that a bargaining 
relationship does not need to satisfy both of these functions to 
benefit from final-offer arbitration. Final-offer arbitration can 
certainly be utilized as a settlement technique when the 
parties are not “locked in.” However, MLB and public 
employment do benefit from both functions, making final-offer 
arbitration a particularly useful tool in those contexts. 
G. How is Final-Offer Arbitration Best Utilized? 
1. Procedural Variation: Package or Issue-by-Issue? 
Before looking at the various contexts that could benefit 
from final-offer arbitration, I will first consider which 
procedural variation best fits within the theories of final-offer 
arbitration: package or issue-by-issue final offers.  
One common criticism of package final-offer arbitration is 
that parties may be tempted to include outrageous offers on a 
small percentage of issues in what is an otherwise reasonable 
package. How should an arbitrator weigh a reasonable 
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package with a few unreasonable offers against a less 
reasonable package that is more consistent? On that note, 
what if both parties include extreme offers on a few issues? 
This would force an arbitrator to decide between the 
unreasonable offers included in each package. Additionally, 
these extreme offers on specific issues may not be feasible and 
put the arbitrator in the difficult position of not being able to 
select a reasonable package at all. Although the theory behind 
final-offer arbitration is that each party will make the most 
reasonable offer possible so that his or her offer will be 
selected, parties may also take advantage of the packaged 
format.  
On the other hand, in an issue-by-issue hearing, the 
bargaining required for each disputed area forces the parties 
to submit reasonable offers on each issue, bringing the 
opposing offers closer together on at least some issues prior to 
hearings. Package final-offers, as compared to issue-by-issue 
arbitration, seem to inhibit pre-hearing settlements. In an 
issue-by-issue arbitration, the parties may be more likely to 
settle specific issues before the hearing, but in package 
arbitration, parties may want to take their chances at the 
hearing so they can assemble a reasonable package that best 
suits their needs. Although in an issue-by-issue arbitration all 
of the issues may not be settled prior to a hearing, the parties 
can eliminate some issues from the dispute. Negotiating a 
settlement with packaged offers, on the other hand, forces the 
parties to negotiate all of the issues at once.  
Despite its advantages, issue-by-issue final-offer 
arbitration can also undermine the goals of final-offer 
arbitration.  An arbitrator may split the difference by 
awarding half of the issues to one party and the other half of 
the issues to the other party.  This gives an arbitrator greater 
discretion to fashion his own package. In a packaged offer, on 
the other hand, an arbitrator is restricted to one complete 
package, unable to split the difference. 
The important thing to consider regarding this scenario is 
whether splitting the difference creates the chilling effect that 
final-offer arbitration seeks to prevent.  As we have seen, the 
risk is that, because the arbitrator is seen as likely to 
compromise, the parties make offers that are far apart: for 
this reason, settlement is unlikely to occur before the hearing. 
Even though it affords an arbitrator greater discretion, when 
an arbitrator splits the difference on a group of multiple 
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issues (and is not permitted to split the difference on any one 
issue), the parties never actually split the difference on a 
singular issue and, therefore, this format neither produces the 
chilling effect nor undermines the goals of final-offer 
arbitration. It is still to the strategic advantage of the parties 
to make reasonable offers as to each issue, as they have no 
way to predict which issues will be determined in their favor.   
While issue-by-issue final offers are more complex than 
package final offers, they are more aligned with the objectives 
of final-offer arbitration. Although limiting the discretion of 
an arbitrator is one goal of final-offer arbitration, its biggest 
aim is to reach settlement before the arbitration hearing. In 
other words, pre-hearing behavior is more relevant to the 
goals of final-offer arbitration than behavior during an actual 
hearing. 
These procedural concerns do not pose a problem in MLB’s 
salary arbitrations because there is only one issue in dispute. 
This may be one reason why MLB’s final-offer salary 
arbitration works so smoothly and efficiently in promoting 
settlement before an arbitration hearing. Because a greater 
number of disputed issues presents the procedural concerns 
discussed above, based on the success of MLB, final-offer 
arbitration presumably works best when there are fewer 
issues at stake. But, when there are multiple issues in 
question, issue-by-issue final offers may be more appropriate.  
2. Timing of the “Final Offers” 
Another important element of final-offer arbitration is the 
timing of the offers. The appropriate timing of offers may help 
to further the goals of the process. The question is whether 
the offers should be submitted just prior to the hearing, early 
in negotiations, or sometime in the middle. In MLB, teams 
and players may submit final offers anytime between January 
5 and January 15.74 If an organization reduces its offer on or 
after January 15, then the player’s window to submit to 
arbitration is extended for seven days.75 The arbitral 
proceedings occur between February 1 and February 20.76 
Between the submission in January and the proceeding in 
 
 74. MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. VI, § (f)(5). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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February, the parties are free to negotiate and, as discussed 
earlier, often opt to settle during these negotiations. 
Final offers should be permitted as early as possible prior 
to the arbitration hearing, but should be adjustable for a 
relatively short grace period. This would positively affect the 
dynamics of the negotiations and promote the goals of final-
offer arbitration. Since MLB teams must submit their offers 
approximately one month before the proceedings, the parties 
are likely to act more reasonably in the early stages of 
negotiations.  Allowing a grace period in which offers are 
adjustable would also promote the goals of final-offer 
arbitration.  Although parties may begin bargaining with 
extreme final offers, they would have to adjust to more 
moderate offers as preliminary negotiations progress. It is 
important that the parties have this grace period to promote a 
“battle of reasonable offers” that would bring the parties 
toward a middle ground. In order to limit the 
unreasonableness of the parties’ early final offers, this grace 
period should not be extended until the hearing. At the end of 
this grace period, the parties’ offers must be as reasonable as 
possible. The combination of the reasonable final offers and 
the fear of losing to the opposing offer would serve to bring 
the parties toward a middle ground.  
One argument against this may be that there is nothing to 
lose from allowing the final offers to be adjusted right up until 
the hearing.  This timeline, however, may encourage parties 
to conceal their most reasonable offers until late in the 
bargaining process. If, for example, there were five days 
between the conclusion of the grace period and the hearing, 
the parties would present their most reasonable final offers 
and likely find a middle ground in the five days leading up to 
the hearing. If the parties have until the day of the 
arbitration, they may conceal their most reasonable offers 
until the proceeding itself, undermining the final-offer goal of 
an efficient pre-hearing settlement. Requiring both the early 
submission of final offers and a narrow window to adjust 
these final offers would best support the goals of final-offer 
arbitration. 
3. Contexts 
After determining which procedural variations may be 
best suited for multiple issue final-offer interest arbitration, 
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we turn our analysis to other contexts which may benefit from 
the use of final-offer arbitration.  
It is important to first outline the elements that make 
final-offer arbitration conducive to a given context. First, it is 
best to have sophisticated parties use final-offer arbitration. 
Some literature has suggested that the parties must 
understand the process in order for it to work.77 The theory is 
that if a party does not understand the objectives of final-offer 
arbitration, the process may be misused. In MLB, it is well 
known among the management, the agents, and even the 
players that the purpose of final-offer salary arbitration is to 
avoid the hearing and to make market adjustments. If two 
unsophisticated parties are involved in a contract dispute, 
they may see an opponent’s more reasonable offer as a 
concession. This party may not understand that a final-offer 
arbitrator is likely to choose the more reasonable offer and, as 
a result, the party may imprudently refuse to submit their 
own reasonable offer. 
Second, final-offer arbitration works best as part of a long-
term, standardized procedure where maintaining positive 
relationships between the parties is a priority. In MLB, salary 
arbitration occurs at the same time each year and has become 
a standardized component of the League’s off-season. 
Additionally, after salary arbitration, players, barring a trade, 
remain with the organization. Therefore, it is important to 
keep the proceedings as amicable as possible.  Final-offer 
arbitration achieves this congenial tone by promoting pre-
hearing settlement and by avoiding the adversarial nature of 
an arbitration proceeding or litigation. Similarly, in the field 
of public employment, final-offer arbitration is a regular 
procedure when collective bargaining agreements are due for 
renewal. Like MLB salary arbitration, it is important to make 
the process as friendly as possible because the public 
employees will continue to work for the city after the interest 
arbitration process has concluded. 
Third, final-offer arbitration is most successful when a pre-
hearing settlement might contain benefits that an arbitration 
award cannot offer. For example, as discussed earlier, MLB 
settlements may include bonuses, multi-year contracts, and 
other incentives that are not available through an arbitration 
 
 77. Angelo DeNisi & James B. Dworkin, Final-Offer Arbitration and the Naïve 
Negotiator, 35 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 78, 79 (1981). 
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award. Another inherent benefit of a pre-hearing settlement 
is its cost effectiveness. Because of its tendency to promote 
settlement, final-offer arbitration is a cheaper, quicker, and 
generally more efficient alternative to conventional 
arbitration and litigation.  This advantage is especially 
critical when a strike or expensive dispute would have a 
debilitating impact on the parties. States presumably use 
final-offer arbitration in public employment disputes to avoid 
the crippling effect of a wildcat strike by employees essential 
to the welfare and safety of the community. 
There are also various private contexts that could benefit 
from reaching pre-hearing settlements. For example, when a 
private dispute involves money, the cost effectiveness of final-
offer arbitration may be beneficial. While it may seem odd for 
private parties to contract for a form of arbitration that is 
intended to avoid arbitration hearings, a party may use it to 
protect itself when it does not know if the opposing party will 
contest the issue in question. 
Some contexts may benefit from final-offer arbitration 
because the bargaining parties must negotiate exclusively 
with each other and have no other recourse within the 
relevant market. Final offer arbitration may be an effective 
tool when parties are “locked in” because they have no other 
method to assert their rights and mimic the market other 
than through the arbitration process. The final-offer 
arbitration process thus allows the parties to re-create the 
market while preserving the amiability of the “locked in” 
bargaining relationship.  
Finally, as detailed in the discussion of the package and 
issue-by-issue procedural variations, final-offer arbitration is 
most effective for addressing as few disputed issues as 
possible. While final-offer arbitration can still be effective 
with multiple issues at stake, arbitrating a few select issues 
allows the parties to avoid the dilemma of choosing the most 
appropriate procedural variation. 
 a. The Employee Free Choice Act and Final-Offer 
Interest Arbitration 
Before considering how final-offer arbitration could be 
utilized outside of public employment and MLB, I will analyze 
the potential role of final-offer interest arbitration under the 
Employee Free Choice Act. If the Employee Free Choice Act, 
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or another NLRA amendment mandating interest arbitration, 
is enacted, there may be a choice between various forms of 
interest arbitration, including final-offer. This paper does not 
take a position on the controversial Act’s mandate of interest 
arbitration but rather analyzes which form of interest 
arbitration should be applied if the Act, or a similar 
amendment, does take effect. 
An important concern regarding the Act’s interest 
arbitration requirement is that unions and employers may 
rely on an arbitrator to impose an agreement rather than 
participating in good-faith bargaining.78 Another 
apprehension is that private parties would be bound to the 
terms of a contract set by an arbitrator.79 The idea is that if 
an employer or union is bound to such terms, it could 
complicate future grievance arbitrations in which an 
arbitrator would apply the disputed terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement to the specific grievance. Although this 
would not complicate the proceeding in a technical sense, 
employers and unions would be forced to apply rules not 
mutually agreed upon. This is a subtle yet critical benefit of 
pre-hearing settlement in interest arbitration.  
Final-offer issue-by-issue interest arbitration, as opposed 
to conventional interest arbitration, is better at addressing 
both of these concerns. Final-offer arbitration encourages 
parties to bargain in good faith and to settle at least some 
issues prior to arbitration so that the contract reflects more of 
a mutual agreement between the union and employer. If 
unions and employers believe that the arbitrator will select 
the more reasonable offer, they each will present reasonable 
offers, bringing the parties toward a middle ground on the 
particular issue.  If the unions and employers settle before 
arbitration, they are bound to the terms mutually agreed 
upon rather than to terms imposed by an arbitrator.  
Under the proposed Act, the arbitrator’s award is binding 
for two years unless the terms are amended by the written 
consent of the parties.80 If the parties choose to participate in 
a final-offer arbitration hearing, one party’s offer will be 
deemed the “winner.” This would likely prevent future 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Andrew Lee Younkins. Judicial Review Standards for Interest Arbitration 
under the Employee Free Choice Act, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 447, 453 (2008). 
 80. See Employee Free Choice Act  § 3. 
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amendment. However, there is little reason to believe parties 
will seek amendment after conventional arbitration; thus, the 
pre-hearing settlement aspects of final-offer arbitration may 
still be preferable.  
Another reason final-offer arbitration may be preferable to 
conventional arbitration is the “locked in” nature of these new 
relationships. After the streamlined certification under the 
proposed amendment to the NLRA, the union becomes the 
exclusive bargaining representative for the employees, and 
the employer and the union must negotiate with each other. 
Like salary arbitration in MLB and interest arbitration in 
public employment, the relationship between certified union 
and employer could benefit from final-offer arbitration 
because of the mandatory and continuing nature of their 
bargaining relationship. 
If the Employee Free Choice Act is enacted, interest 
arbitration will become a requirement between unions and 
employers who cannot agree on the terms of their first 
collective bargaining agreement. In this context, final-offer 
interest arbitration may be appropriate to counteract the 
“chilled” bargaining associated with conventional arbitration. 
As it is in the best interests of both “locked in” parties to 
maintain a congenial relationship after the proceeding, the 
settlement promoting aspects of final-offer arbitration are 
preferable. Therefore, final-offer interest arbitration would be 
a suitable method for executing the mandatory interest 
arbitration under the proposed legislation. 
 b. Interest Arbitration and Economic Issues 
Within interest arbitration, a state may choose particular 
issues to be covered by final-offer arbitration. Michigan’s 
statute requiring interest arbitration for police and fire 
departments distinguishes between economic and non-
economic issues. Economic issues, such as wages, vacations, 
insurance, and other economic benefits are well suited to the 
theories of final-offer arbitration.  For example, if police 
officers in Michigan dispute the amount of vacation time they 
would receive in the new collective bargaining agreement, 
final-offer arbitration would promote settlement. In a 
conventional arbitration, the policemen’s union could assume 
that the arbitrator would compromise and, based on this 
assumption, make an extreme numerical offer to secure as 
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many vacation days as possible. The city may similarly offer 
an unreasonably low number of vacation days. In final-offer 
arbitration, on the other hand, the union or employer would 
be more likely to make a reasonable offer so that their offer is 
selected and the officers receive an acceptable amount of 
vacation time. As economic issues often hinge on a numerical 
value, final-offer arbitration makes sense in that it would 
function in a fashion similar to MLB salary arbitration. Even 
when economic issues do not hinge on a number, a risk of 
arbitral compromise still exists, making final-offer arbitration 
a useful tool. 
The reason for distinguishing between non-economic and 
economic issues may also be due to the nature of non-
economic issues as opposed to economic issues. With respect 
to non-economic issues, an arbitrator may not be able to 
compromise certain non-economic issues thereby eliminating 
the risk of arbitral compromise. For example, how would an 
arbitrator compromise a non-economic issue such as whether 
police officers should be permitted to bring their police cars 
home with them? The officers can either bring them home, or 
they cannot. There is no recognizable middle ground. Final-
offer arbitration is meant to address the “chilled” bargaining 
associated with conventional arbitration in certain contexts. 
Without any risk of arbitral compromise, final-offer 
arbitration may not be necessary to counteract this “chilled” 
bargaining. 
A dispute over vacation time or other economic perks, on 
the other hand, can benefit from final-offer arbitration 
because of the numerical nature of these issues and the risk of 
arbitral compromise. For non-economic disputes it may be 
difficult to identify a middle ground or what constitutes a 
reasonable offer.  Additionally, the bargaining risks 
associated with conventional arbitration that final-offer 
arbitration is meant to address do not apply to certain non-
economic issues. Limiting a state statute to final-offer 
arbitration of economic issues would restrict final-offer 
arbitration to those issues that it is most effective at settling.  
Distinguishing between economic and non-economic issues 
is one way to identify those issues that are most appropriate 
for final-offer arbitration. It is important to distinguish 
between the two issues so that final-offer arbitration can be 
used when it is most appropriate and necessary to counteract 
the chilled bargaining associated with conventional arbitrator 
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compromise. 
 c. Value Disputes 
One type of private dispute that may benefit from final-
offer arbitration is a dispute over the value of an item or 
service. Final-offer arbitration is ideal for facilitating 
settlement in these disputes. Like numerical economic issues, 
this would proceed in a similar fashion to baseball salary 
arbitration. When a specific value is in question, final-offer 
arbitration may counteract the chilling effect of conventional 
arbitration because there is an identifiable middle ground 
between any two offers.  
When money is the primary issue in a dispute, parties may 
be more willing to settle because of the looming costs of an 
arbitration hearing or litigation. Therefore, final-offer 
arbitration offers the prospect of a cost-efficient settlement. 
With regard to value disputes, various private 
relationships would benefit from final-offer arbitration. For 
example, long-term contracts could use final-offer arbitration 
to resolve pricing disputes. Such arbitration would allow 
these contracts to adjust to changes in the market in an 
efficient manner. Additionally, parties to a long-term contract 
have a continuing relationship that is best preserved through 
the more amicable use of final-offer arbitration.  
One example would be a long-term contract in a 
commodities market, such as oil. Sophisticated parties could 
contract for final-offer arbitration as to pricing disputes based 
on fluctuations in the market. Final-offer arbitration can 
provide for an efficient resolution so that a business may 
adjust through a final-offer induced settlement without the 
financial damage of an arbitration proceeding or litigation. 
Another example is a contract between multiple investors for 
the proceeds of an invention. Private parties could stipulate in 
their contract that any disputes over royalties must be 
submitted to final-offer arbitration. With only one monetary 
issue at stake in a long-term contract between sophisticated 
parties, such disputes are ideal for such arbitration. 
Another area that could benefit from final-offer arbitration 
is the entertainment field. In the past few years, monetary 
residuals of new media have been a controversial topic.81 As 
 
 81. As of May, 2009, the Screen Actors Guild (“SAG”) and the Alliance of Motion 
TULIS_FORMATTED 1/19/2010  3:45 PM 
112 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 20.1 
new media outlets such as Hulu and iTunes are created, 
writers and actors have been excluded from the resulting 
economic benefits because the new media were not 
contemplated in their original contracts.  This led to the 
Writers’ Guild strike in 2008 and to the 2009 collective 
bargaining struggle between the Screen Actors Guild and the 
Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers 
(“AMPTP”).  
When new media are created, actors and writers could 
benefit from the inclusion of a clause for final-offer arbitration 
in either individual contracts or a future collective bargaining 
agreement. Collective bargaining agreements in the 
entertainment industry are similar to those in the sports 
world in that individuals may bargain under the general 
umbrella of the collective agreement. As the parties have a 
continuing and “locked in” relationship, final-offer arbitration 
as to these controversial residuals may be an effective tool. 
When the next “Hulu” is created, actors and producers may 
have final-offer arbitration in their contracts, or a bargaining 
agreement that promotes an efficient settlement for how the 
ensuing residuals are to be applied. 
A final example is a monetary dispute related to real 
estate development. In any contract between architects, 
general contractors, subcontractors, or buyers, it is inevitable 
that the project will result in some dispute as to the value of a 
service. It would be beneficial for these contracts to include a 
final-offer arbitration clause to promote the settlement of 
these disputes in a cost-efficient manner. For example, a 
general contractor may contract with a subcontractor for 
$50,000 but if the subcontractor unexpectedly values his work 
at $75,000, a monetary dispute will arise that could be settled 
through the use of final-offer arbitration. In this scenario, 
liability is not at issue, rather, the parties are simply 
disputing a numerical value. Reasonable offers do exist in 
 
Picture and Television Producers (AMPTP) are negotiating a new collective bargaining 
agreement. For thirteen months, the two parties have failed to reach an agreement. 
Recently, the AMPTP offered a contract that SAG members are voting on. The most 
controversial topic has been the residuals from new media such as iTunes and Hulu. 
Because these new media were not contemplated in the original contracts, the actors 
and writers are not receiving economic benefits when their work is downloaded on 
iTunes or viewed on Hulu. The current offer provides residuals from streaming 
websites such as Hulu. Bob Strauss, SAG Members Set To Vote On New Pact, L.A. 
DAILY NEWS, May 18, 2009, available at http://www.dailynews.com/news/ci_12399660.   
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such situations, and two sophisticated parties will understand 
that a final-offer arbitrator will choose the most reasonable 
offer, bringing the parties to a middle ground. These parties 
may have an interest in maintaining a professional 
relationship and a settlement may be desirable to serve that 
end.  
The list of private value disputes that could contract for 
final-offer arbitration is seemingly endless. When a long-term 
contract and sophisticated parties are involved, final-offer 
arbitration of value disputes is a viable option.   
Of course, final-offer arbitration need not be limited to 
value disputes. Value disputes do benefit from final-offer 
arbitration because, in these contexts, there is almost always 
a risk of arbitral compromise. But any situation where such a 
risk exists would benefit from final-offer arbitration. Value 
disputes are just one scenario in which the risk of arbitral 
compromise is clear to the parties and would undoubtedly 
affect bargaining behavior. 
 d. Professional Sports Leagues and Final-Offer 
Salary Arbitration: Is Major League Baseball an 
Anomaly?  
The successful use of final-offer salary arbitration in MLB 
raises the question of whether other leagues’ collective 
bargaining agreements could benefit from the use of final-
offer salary arbitration. Salary arbitration is an ideal 
situation for final-offer arbitration because the dispute is 
economic in nature, utilizes a standardized procedure, and 
involves a continuing relationship between sophisticated 
parties. Additionally, in any sports contract, there are 
contractual benefits to settling before salary arbitration 
hearings, such as bonuses and multi-year contracts. If a sport 
uses salary arbitration, then final-offer arbitration makes 
sense.  
In the sports world, however, MLB’s use of salary 
arbitration appears to be an anomaly. Since players currently 
flourish under National Football League (NFL) and National 
Basketball Association (NBA) free agency, a player-driven 
process such as salary arbitration is not currently necessary. 
The NFL and NBA use restricted free agency, in lieu of salary 
arbitration, to adjust a player’s salary. The use of restricted 
free agency in these two leagues allows other teams to offer a 
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contract to players that the original team has the option to 
match.82 This process lets the market itself determine the 
players’ value while permitting the team to retain the player 
if they agree to the players’ value. The idea of salary 
arbitration is to mimic the market. With restricted free 
agency, the NFL and NBA use the market itself to adjust a 
player’s salary while allowing the teams to retain a player if 
they choose to accept the market’s valuation. In addition, the 
NFL and the NBA, like the NHL, have salary caps that make 
salary arbitration less desirable for players and owners alike.  
Further, NFL teams typically do not grant guaranteed 
contracts to their second-tier players, which can make binding 
salary arbitration less attractive. The reason is that such 
players may be released at any time after a potential award, 
unless the salary arbitration process protects against such a 
release. This may change, however, when a new collective 
bargaining agreement is negotiated during or before 2011.83  
This new agreement likely will result in a salary structure 
that will allow teams to grant more guaranteed contracts and 
will undoubtedly include a rookie pay scale as it functions in 
the NBA.84 Because of this pay scale, salary arbitration may 
be an option to protect rookies a couple years into their initial 
contract. For example, NFL rookies currently receive 
substantial contracts.85 With a potential pay scale, however, 
 
 82. See Ryan T. Dryer, Comment, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective 
Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 267, 277. 
 83. In May 2008, NFL owners voted unanimously to opt out of the league’s current 
labor deal. If a deal is not reached before 2011, then the owners may lockout the 
players. John Clayton, NFL owners vote unanimously to opt out of labor deal, 
ESPN.COM, May 20, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3404596. 
 84. On April 2, 2009, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell stated that rookie salaries 
are excessive and that the new collective bargaining agreement should address this: 
“The money should go to the people that have produced on the NFL level or on the 
professional level....And I just think, though we’ve had a number of great rookies 
coming in, not everyone makes that transition as successfully, and you want to make 
sure that the system rewards the people who perform and I think that’s what we have 
to figure out in the next collective bargaining agreement. How do we pay the players 
fairly? How do we compensate them properly after they’ve proven themselves on the 
NFL level?” John Clayton, Time to fix rookie salary structure, ESPN.COM, Apr. 2, 2009, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=clayton_john&id=4036126. As 
the union does not yet represent rookies, it seems inevitable that rookie salaries will be 
capped in the upcoming collective bargaining agreement.  
 85. Jake Long, the first pick in the 2008 NFL Draft, received a $57.75 million 
contract with a $30 million signing bonus, making him the highest paid lineman in the 
NFL before even stepping out onto the field. Dolphins sign Long, will select OT No. 1 
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NFL rookies would be relegated to a certain salary depending 
on where they are drafted. Salary arbitration could be a 
useful tool for reevaluating a player’s performance during the 
player’s rookie contract, prior to free agent eligibility.  This 
would function similarly to MLB salary arbitration. If the 
rookie performs well, then his salary may adjust with the 
market. Because NFL teams historically have been willing to 
give inflated sums to rookies, the restrictive salary cap is less 
of a hindrance to salary arbitration than it is in the 
financially unstable NHL. In the unlikely event that salary 
arbitration is used in the NFL in the context of the inevitable 
rookie pay scale, final-offer arbitration would be a tool to 
facilitate efficient settlements much like those of MLB.  
If the NHL had not instituted a hard salary cap,86 it could 
have benefitted from a switch to final-offer arbitration. While 
it remains a viable option, the diminishing importance of 
salary arbitration in the NHL makes it a concern less worthy 
of comment, especially considering the League’s troubled 
financial issues.87 While final-offer arbitration would not solve 
the NHL’s escalating salaries, it would be a more efficient 
way for player salaries to adjust to market value. For a league 
that struggles financially,88 avoiding costly arbitration 
proceedings and promoting settlement could only be of help. 
However, particular aspects of the NHL’s bargaining 
agreement might undermine the theories of final-offer 
arbitration. For example, the fact that NHL owners can walk 
away from an arbitration award may inhibit settlement 
because management may want to risk arbitration since it is 
not necessarily saddled with the arbitrator’s decision. 
With respect to professional sports leagues, it is unlikely 
that final-offer arbitration will be used outside of MLB simply 
because salary arbitration does not fit within the structure of 
the other leagues. If salary arbitration were appropriate in a 
given league, however, final-offer arbitration would be a 
better option than conventional arbitration. 
 
 
overall, ESPN.COM, Apr. 22, 2008, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/draft08/news/story?id=3358424. As a result of the pay 
scale, the first pick in the NBA Draft receives less than $4 million a year.  
 86. Yoost, supra note 28, at 523. 
 87. See NHL Business, http://www.andrewsstarspage.com/NHL-Business/ (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2009). 
 88. Id. 
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H. Conclusion 
Final-offer arbitration works well as a salary adjuster in 
MLB and has proven to be a workable option in public 
employment interest arbitration. Final-offer arbitration, 
however, need not and should not be limited to MLB and 
public employment. There are numerous private relationships 
that could benefit from using such arbitration as a 
contractual tool to resolve disputes in an efficient manner. 
III. WHAT FACTORS SHOULD A FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATOR BE 
PERMITTED TO CONSIDER? 
A. The Criteria an Arbitrator May Consider 
In interest arbitration, selecting the controlling criteria for 
a proceeding is a complicated and important task. For 
grievance arbitration, one need only look at what the parties 
intended in a contract, whereas in salary arbitration and 
public employment interest arbitration, no single factor is 
controlling. For example, in a MLB wage determination, 
comparing one player’s performance to that of another player 
will provide an arbitrator with guidance, but there are other 
relevant factors to consider, such as the length and 
consistency of the player’s career contribution. The 
determination does not hinge on one single factor and the 
weight and use of each factor is debatable.89  
This section will examine the criteria that a final-offer 
arbitrator is typically allowed to consider and how such 
factors mesh with the theories and goals of final-offer 
arbitration. This section will place particular emphasis on the 
appropriate number of criteria, the thoroughness of each 
criterion, the weight each criterion receives, and whether a 
private- or public-sector arbitrator should consider an 
employer’s financial position.  
A collective bargaining agreement, statute, or private 
agreement typically dictates the criteria an arbitrator may or 
must consider and, in some cases, which criteria must be 
excluded.  Common criteria include: comparability, ability to 
 
 89. For example, when considering an employer’s financial position: what 
information is relevant? Is speculative information appropriate? Additionally, what 
weight is given to this factor as compared to the other relevant factors? 
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pay, productivity, variations in job content or hazards, 
historical trends, equity, forces within the marketplace, and 
criteria that are specifically geared toward a respective 
context.90  The purpose of setting criteria is to mimic the 
market. An arbitrator is establishing market value so the 
factors serve to re-create the parties’ bargaining market in 
the absence of the arbitrator. In some instances, however, 
agreed-upon policy may require that the market not be 
perfectly re-created due to the nature of the given context. 
Comparability and an employer’s financial position have 
proven to be the most controversial factors.91 Arbitrators are 
likely to decide in such a way as to increase their professional 
demand.  Because it follows that they would adhere strictly to 
the factors outlined in a given agreement or statute, 
establishing the most appropriate list of criteria can enhance 
the efficacy of final-offer arbitration. 
B. Major League Baseball’s Salary Arbitration Criteria 
In MLB salary arbitration, the criteria an arbitrator may 
consider include the quality of the player’s contribution to his 
team during the past season; the length and consistency of his 
career contribution; the record of the player’s past 
compensation; comparative baseball salaries; the existence of 
any physical or mental defects on the part of the player; and 
the recent performance record of the team including, but not 
limited to, its league standing and attendance as an 
indication of public acceptance.92 The agreement allows the 
arbitrator, in his discretion, to assign a weight to each of the 
criteria that appears appropriate under the circumstances.93  
1. Weight Issues 
One potential issue is the lack of pre-assigned weight 
given to the criteria, which may impede settlement. MLB’s 
 
 90. Tim Bornstein, Interest Arbitration in Public Employment: An Arbitrator View 
of the Process, 83 LAB. J. 77, 83 (1978).  
 91. Comparability is criticized because it creates an unending spiral of wage 
increases and because it often relies on evidence that is unclear, ambiguous and easily 
manipulated. Ability to pay is controversial, especially in the public sector, because it 
has been criticized as speculative and unfair to employees. These criteria often conflict 
with each other. See Martin, supra note 63, at 69. 
 92. See MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. VI, § (f)(12). 
 93. Id. 
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collective bargaining agreement instructs the arbitrators to 
consider both the player’s prior-year performance as well as 
his entire career performance, but does not instruct an 
arbitrator on how to weigh these factors with respect to 
comparability.94 Inconsistencies between a player’s 
performance throughout his career and the most recent 
season may keep offers apart, which runs contrary to the 
theory of final-offer arbitration. Because the agreement does 
not prioritize among these conflicting factors, a team and a 
player may disagree as to which factor is more important. 
Consider the following hypothetical: Player A performs at a 
$10 million level for the first two seasons of his career but 
plays at a $1 million level in his third year. Player A’s agent 
will want to consider the player’s whole career while 
management will emphasize the player’s performance during 
the most recent season. This keeps the parties in 
disagreement and inhibits settlement. In final-offer 
arbitration, the criteria should be geared toward promoting 
pre-hearing settlement. When any two criteria have the 
potential to conflict, each party may interpret the conflict in 
its favor. If an agreement were to outline how such a conflict 
should be interpreted in arbitration, the parties would be 
better able to predict an arbitrator’s behavior and more likely 
to settle on a middle ground prior to arbitration. 
2. Inadmissible Evidence  
The agreement also stipulates six types of inadmissible 
evidence in an arbitration proceeding. The financial position 
of a player or club is one such factor.95 The agreement also 
prohibits parties from discussing, and arbitrators from 
considering, the League’s Competitive Balance Tax (also 
known as the League’s “luxury tax”).96 This tax, created in 
2000, requires teams whose payroll exceeds a certain figure, 
calculated each year, be taxed on this excess amount.97  This 
tax is deposited into a League “industry growth fund.”98  
These exclusions are examples of how an agreement’s criteria 
 
 94. See ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 150. Abrams listed this weight issue as one 
reason why parties in baseball arbitration may not settle. 
 95. See MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at § (f)(12)(b)(i). 
 96. Id. § (f)(14). 
 97. Id. art. XXIII. 
 98. Id. 
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may purposefully skew the market. Although the market for 
players would undoubtedly be affected by the financial 
position of a given team, it may be in the “best interests of 
baseball” to exclude a team’s financial position in the context 
of salary arbitration so that a player is not punished for being 
drafted by a financially inferior organization. This exclusion 
is one of the few complaints among owners regarding final-
offer arbitration. Baseball management has criticized salary 
arbitration since 1974 for inflating player salaries by 
overemphasizing the comparability factor while excluding a 
team’s financial position.99  
Studies have noted that even players who “lose” 
arbitration still make, on average, a 150% increase from their 
previous year’s salary.100  The reason for this increase is that 
salary arbitration is a tool designed to adjust a player’s salary 
to the current market and to the player’s performance. 
Typically, salary arbitration occurs while a player is still 
bound by an inexpensive rookie contract so it is expected that 
salaries will increase to adjust a player’s salary to match their 
performance. A player is unlikely to deserve less than what 
he earned before playing in the major leagues, so it comes as 
little surprise that salaries increase in baseball salary 
arbitration. There is validity, however, to the argument that 
salary arbitration essentially forces small-market teams to 
account for the extravagant free-agent spending of big-market 
teams.  This has forced many small-market teams to trade 
away arbitration-eligible players.101  
If an arbitrator were to consider a team’s financial 
position, however, a small-market team would be more likely 
to risk an arbitration hearing than to settle for a salary it 
cannot, or would prefer not to, pay. On the other hand, the 
 
 99. See ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 164. 
 100. James B. Dworkin. Collective Bargaining in Baseball: Key Current-Issues, 39 
LAB. L.J. 480 (1988). 
 101. For example, this past off-season, the Florida Marlins, notorious for cutting 
costs and maintaining a low payroll, traded arbitration-eligible first-baseman Mike 
Jacobs to the Kansas City Royals. Jacobs, who had earned $395,000 with the Marlins in 
2008, was signed by the Royals to a one-year, $3.275 million contract. The Marlins 
traded Jacobs because they did not want to pay for Jacobs’ expected salary increase. 
This is a common occurrence when players on small-market teams become eligible for 
arbitration. It should be noted that the Royals are also a small-market team, but 
typically have a much higher payroll than the Marlins.  Slugger Jacobs agrees to one-
year deal with Royals, CBSSPORTS.COM, Feb. 18, 2009, 
http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/story/11390437.  
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policy likely behind this exclusion is that players should not 
be punished for being drafted by financially inferior teams. A 
delicate balance could be achieved that would allow a player 
to adjust his salary within the confines of a team’s financial 
capabilities, but the fact remains that allowing an arbitrator 
to consider a team’s financial position would run contrary to 
theories of final-offer arbitration. One idea is that arbitrators, 
in implementing the comparability factor, take into account 
the financial position of a comparable player’s organization. A 
player for a big-market team who makes $10 million may be 
very different from a player for a small-market team who 
makes $10 million. The collective bargaining agreement 
apparently attempts to address this by noting that “the 
arbitration panel shall consider the salaries of all comparable 
players and not merely the salary of a single player or group 
of players.”102 Expanding upon this language could appease 
the owners’ concerns while continuing to promote settlement 
and allowing the arbitration process to account for a player’s 
increased value. Additionally, greater specificity would give 
the parties a better understanding of how an arbitrator will 
view a player’s market value, even if that market value is not 
a perfect reflection of the actual market. 
The policy behind excluding information regarding which 
teams may be subject to the luxury tax is that an arbitrator 
should not base a player’s salary on the fact that a wealthy 
team, such as the New York Yankees, may have to pay double 
for its arbitration-eligible players.103 Unlike the excluded 
financial position criterion, excluding information regarding 
the luxury tax has not faced much criticism. It is relevant, 
however, as an example of an excluded factor that is 
disadvantageous to big-market teams.   
C. Criteria Permitted in State Statutes 
Generally, final-offer state statutes require an arbitrator 
to consider factors similar to those listed for salary arbitration 
in MLB’s collective bargaining agreement. For example, 
comparability is a central aspect of both state statutes and 
 
 102. MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 4, at art. VI, § (f)(13). 
 103. For example, if an arbitrator awards a New York Yankee $5 million, the 
Yankees must pay $5 million to the player and an additional $5 million to the “industry 
growth fund” if the team has surpassed the payroll cap for a given year.  MLB 
Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XXIII. 
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the MLB agreement.104 One notable difference, however, is 
that the state statutes typically require an arbitrator to 
consider the employer’s financial position and do not explicitly 
exclude any criteria.105 The final-offer statutes of Wisconsin, 
Maine, Michigan, and New Jersey, each discussed in Part II, 
have a “financial position” requirement.106 Although financial 
position considerations differ between team owners, other 
private employers, and state municipalities, the policy 
underlying the consideration of any employer’s financial 
situation may enlighten our understanding of MLB’s explicit 
exclusion of a team’s financial position. Additionally, 
comparing a state statute’s list of criteria and the weight 
given to each criterion will be helpful in determining how 
criteria should be laid out in any final-offer agreement.  
 1. Maine 
The Maine Agriculture Marketing and Bargaining Act lists 
eleven factors that an arbitrator is required to consider, such 
as “the producer’s costs of production including the cost that 
would be involved in paying farm labor a fair wage rate” and 
“the impact of the award on the competitive position of the 
handler in the market area or competing market areas.”107 
The Act does not outline what weight should be given to each 
factor nor does it explicitly exclude any factors.108 A list of 
eleven factors does not seem to help achieve the goals of final-
 
 104. For example, Wisconsin requires a “comparison of wages, hours and conditions 
of the municipal employees involved in the arbitration proceedings with the wages, 
hours and conditions of employment of other employees performing similar services. 
WISC. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(6)(D) (Lexis 2008).  Michigan, New Jersey and Connecticut, 
among others, also have comparability factors. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 423.239(9)(d) 
(Lexis 2008); N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16(g)(2); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-276a(e)(5) (2008).  
 105. Iowa requires a final-offer arbitrator to consider “the interests of the welfare of 
the public, the ability of the employer to finance the economic adjustments and the 
effect of such adjustments on the normal standard of services.” IOWA CODE ANN. § 
20.22(9)(c). Maine, New Jersey, Connecticut, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
Washington, Wisconsin and Michigan have similar requirements. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
TIT. 13 § 1958-B(5-A);.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16(g)(6) (2009). CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5-
276a(e)(3) (Lexis 2008). MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.16 (Subd. 7) (Lexis 2008). OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. TIT. § 51-108(4) (Lexis 2008), PA. STAT. ANN. § 11-1122-A (Lexis 2008), 
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 35.21.779(2)(6) (Lexis 2009). WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(6)(C) 
(Lexis 2008).  MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 423.239(9)(C). 
 106. N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16 (g)(6); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (6)(C);  MICH. COMP. 
LAWS. ANN. § 423.239(9)(c). 
 107. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1958-B(5-A) (D), (F).  
 108. Id. 
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offer arbitration. Perhaps Maine should reduce the number of 
factors or require an arbitrator to explain the weight given to 
each factor. Because the ultimate goal of final-offer 
arbitration is settlement, it may follow that the arbitrators 
should consider as few factors as possible because the parties 
will be negotiating only as to those factors. If the parties are 
required to consider a long list of factors, settlement may be 
less likely. While it is possible that each of these eleven 
factors is essential to Maine agricultural law, the theories 
underlying final-offer arbitration suggest that only the 
essential criteria be considered. 
In discussing Maine’s criteria, it is important to remember 
that the Act is unique in that it deals with the financial 
position of “handlers” rather than municipalities. The clause 
that requires arbitrators to consider the impact of an award 
on the competitive position of the handler in the market is 
interesting in light of MLB’s exclusion of a team’s financial 
position. Like major league teams, handlers are in a 
competitive market. Although MLB considers the individual 
player market and a team’s competitiveness in terms of “on 
the field” success for establishing a player’s market value, it 
does not consider the competitive market as it relates to the 
award or any future award’s potential impact on a team’s 
financial competitiveness.  
  2. New Jersey 
New Jersey’s Employer-Employee Relations Act lists nine 
factors that an arbitrator may consider.109 The Act requires 
that in a final-offer or conventional arbitration, the arbitrator 
give “due weight to those factors. . .that are relevant for the 
resolution of the specific dispute.”110 The statute also requires 
that, in the award, an arbitrator indicate which factors are 
relevant, satisfactorily explain why the others are irrelevant, 
and provide an analysis of the evidence for each relevant 
factor.”111  
The financial position criterion in New Jersey’s statute has 
been the subject of literature, case law, and legislative 
 
 109. N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16 (g). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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proposals.112 Some critics have argued that the financial 
position factor should be given more weight, and that 
arbitrator discretion as to weight has led to incessant wage 
increases New Jersey’s municipalities cannot afford.113 These 
same critics attribute these wage increases to the 
comparability factor. Thus, the argument is that the criteria 
do not provide an accurate reflection of the market for less-
affluent municipalities. In 1992, various proposals in the New 
Jersey Legislature unsuccessfully sought to control the wage 
increases associated with the comparability factor by putting 
greater emphasis on the state’s financial capacity.114  
A separate question is the weight to be accorded to each 
criterion. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, on multiple 
occasions prior to 1995, found that arbitrators did not give 
each criterion the correct weight and the legislature has made 
attempts to address the issue. The court repeatedly 
emphasized that each of the eight factors must be more 
carefully evaluated.115 Increased judicial review is a risk 
associated with requiring an arbitrator to outline the weight 
given to each factor. However, especially in a final-offer 
arbitration setting, such review may prevent excessive 
arbitrator discretion and thereby help the parties predict an 
arbitrator’s actions. The court also noted that merely 
determining that a municipality has the financial capability 
to meet the employees’ demands should not satisfy the 
“financial impact” factor.116 An arbitrator is not limited to 
simply determining whether the municipality can pay, but 
may also focus on whether the municipality should pay given 
the financial impact. Since most state statutes provide little 
guidance as to the extent that a city’s financial position 
should be a factor, the court’s interpretation is worth noting.  
In 1995, New Jersey’s statute was amended to expand 
upon the language of the “financial position” factor.117  The 
 
 112. See Martin, supra note 63.  See also P.L. 1996, Chapter 425, 206th Leg., 2nd 
Annual Sess. (N.J. 1995); Fox v. Morris County Policemen’s Ass’n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J. 
Super. 501 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Twp. of Washington v. N.J. State 
Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n, Local 206, 137 N.J. 88 (1994). New Jersey requires that 
an arbitrator take into account “the financial impact on the governing unit, its 
residents and its taxpayers.” N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16 (g). 
 113. See Martin, supra note 63, at 62. 
 114. 80 N.J. LEGIS. INDEX NO. 2, at A-836 (Feb. 9, 1993) 
 115.  See Fox, supra note 112. See also Twp. of Washington, supra note 112. 
 116. See Twp. of Washington, supra note 112. 
 117. P.L. 1996, supra note 112. 
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Legislature added language to clarify how the “financial 
impact” should be analyzed.118 Although this language 
undoubtedly gives the arbitrator clarification as to how to 
apply the factor, it does not address concerns as to the weight 
an arbitrator should apply to a municipality’s ability to pay. 
Critics note that arbitrator awards are still too high and that 
the legislature has not appropriately considered the limited 
ability of municipalities to fund increases in pay.119  
Overall, however, New Jersey’s willingness to clarify the 
financial position factor is encouraging and may promote 
settlement. The statute now allows less room for an 
arbitrator’s interpretation. Before the amendment, parties 
may have been less likely to agree on how a municipality’s 
ability to pay should be applied in an arbitration proceeding. 
As the factor is now more detailed, the arbitrator’s discretion 
is limited, which may make the parties more likely to agree 
on how the factor will be applied in arbitration. This 
increased predictability should promote pre-hearing 
settlement. 
 3. Michigan, Wisconsin, and Catch-All Factors 
Michigan’s final-offer statute for firemen and policemen 
requires that an arbitrator consider eight relatively vague 
factors including “the interests of the public and the financial 
 
 118. N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16 (g). Prior to 1995, section (g)(6) read, “[t]he financial 
impact on the governing unit, its residents and taxpayers.” The 1995 amendment added 
the following language:  
When considering this factor in a dispute in which the public employer is a 
county or a municipality, the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators shall take into 
account, to the extent that evidence is introduced, how the award will affect 
the municipal or county purposes element, as the case may be, of the local 
property tax; a comparison of the percentage of the municipal purposes 
element or, in the case of a county, the county purposes element, required to 
fund the employees’ contract in the proceeding local budget year with that 
required under the award for the current local budget year; the impact of the 
award for each income sector of the property taxpayers of the local unit; the 
impact of the award on the ability of the governing body to (a) maintain 
existing local programs and services, (b) expand existing local programs and 
services for which public moneys have been designated by the governing body 
in a proposed local budget, or (c) initiate any new programs and services for 
which public moneys have been designated by the governing body in a 
proposed local budget. 
 119. E-mail from Robert Martin, Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, to 
Benjamin A. Tulis (March 2009) (on file with author). See also Martin, supra note 63.  
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ability of the unit of government to meet these costs.”120 The 
statute does not assign any particular weight to its eight 
factors and notes that the panel should base its findings and 
opinions on these factors only “if applicable.”121 The factors in 
Michigan are guidelines rather than strict criteria, giving an 
arbitrator greater discretion to decide the economic issues in 
dispute. For the purposes of final-offer arbitration, it is better 
to apply strict criteria so that the parties can agree on what 
an arbitrator will consider and ultimately decide. Unlike New 
Jersey’s final-offer statute, Michigan’s “financial position” 
factor remains vague.122 The Court of Appeals of Michigan has 
noted that while an arbitrator must consider a city’s financial 
ability, a financial inability to pay does not automatically 
mean that the city’s final offer will be selected.123 Greater 
specificity in the factor could address this issue and would 
allow the parties to agree on how an arbitrator would apply 
the criterion. Instead, Michigan’s vague factor has led to 
arbitration proceedings and judicial review.  
Wisconsin’s final-offer statute lists eight factors, similar to 
those listed in Michigan’s statute, including a requirement 
that an arbitrator consider “the interests and the welfare of 
the public and the financial ability of the unit of government 
to meet these costs,” but it does not require that any specific 
weight be given to any of the factors.124 The statute merely 
states that the arbitrator shall “give weight” to the listed 
factors.125 
Both Michigan and Wisconsin’s final-offer statutes also 
contain a residual, or catch-all factor, with identical language, 
for the arbitrator to consider “such other factors, not confined 
to the foregoing, which are normally or traditionally taken 
into consideration in determining wages, hours and 
employment through voluntary collective bargaining, 
 
 120. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 423.239 (9)(c). 
 121. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 423.239. 
 122. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 423.239 (c). Michigan’s statute requires that an 
arbitrator consider “the interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of 
the unit of government to meet these costs.” New Jersey, on the other hand, clarified 
the vague nature of its statutory language, likely in response to litigation. Maine and 
Wisconsin’s financial position factors are similar to Michigan’s. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
TIT. 13 § 1958-B(5-A)(D); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(6)(C), 
 123. Hamtramck v. Hamtramck Firefighters Ass’n, 128 Mich. App. 457 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1983). 
 124. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(6)(C).   
 125. Id. 
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mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or otherwise between the 
parties, in the public service or in private employment.”126 
Maine’s final-offer statute includes a similar catch-all 
factor.127 New Jersey’s statute, on the other hand, lacks a 
catch-all factor.128 
These residual factors give an arbitrator greater flexibility 
to determine which final offer is most appropriate. For 
example, the Third District Court of Appeals in Wisconsin 
found that an arbitrator, who used the catch-all factor, did not 
err in evaluating the final-offer proposals by speculating as to 
the economic effect a new jail would have on the city’s 
financial position in evaluating the final-offer proposals.129 
The Wisconsin Professional Police Association argued that the 
prospective economic impacts could not be characterized as 
definite because they were unpredictable and could vary, but 
the court allowed the arbitrator’s use of speculative 
information under Wisconsin’s catch-all factor.130 
How does the presence of these catch-all factors relate to 
the theories of final-offer arbitration? Catch-all factors may 
complicate negotiations. For example, if one party to a 
negotiation makes an offer based on what it believes to be a 
relevant factor under the catch-all, but the other party does 
not agree with the relevance of this factor, the parties are less 
likely to find a middle ground. If the parties must adhere to a 
strict, finite list of criteria, however, they are more likely to be 
in agreement during pre-hearing negotiations.  
D. Conclusion 
 Each context utilizing final-offer arbitration may 
require different criteria depending on the nature of the 
parties and the respective market. There is no universal set of 
criteria that can be applied to every final-offer setting. 
However, the list of criteria in any agreement or state statute 
 
 126.  Id. § (h). 
 127. Maine’s final-offer statute requires an arbitrator to consider “other factors 
which are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in determining prices, 
quality, quantity and the costs of other services involved.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 
§ 1958-B(5-A) (K). 
 128. N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16(g). 
 129. Wisconsin Prof’l Police Ass’n v. Oneida County, 2001 WI App 58 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2001). See also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(6)(H) (Lexis 2008).   
 130. Id. at *10. 
TULIS_FORMATTED 1/19/2010  3:45 PM 
2010] Final-Offer Arbitration 127 
should be formulated to promote the underlying theories and 
goals of final-offer arbitration. 
 1. When Should Factors Be Excluded?  
Similar to the list of admissible criteria, the list of 
inadmissible criteria in any agreement or statute will vary in 
different contexts. For example, in their respective 
proceedings, it is more important to consider a municipality’s 
ability to pay than the financial position of a sports 
organization. MLB has its own reasons for prohibiting an 
arbitrator from considering a team’s ability to pay.131 
Excluded factors, however, may also be utilized to promote 
settlement. This may not be the reason behind the exclusion 
in baseball.  If a small-market baseball team were aware that 
its financial position would be considered, it would be more 
likely to try to win arbitration rather than settle. The team 
could then trade a player if it lost the arbitration, in order to 
save money. A municipality, on the other hand, does not have 
the option to trade its firemen if the municipality loses 
arbitration. An agreement could exclude factors in an effort to 
promote pre-hearing settlement as long as the excluded factor 
is not an essential criterion. 
2. Weight Issues  
Because every dispute varies, it is difficult to restrict an 
arbitrator to a specific weight for each factor. Regardless, 
clarification would further the theories of final-offer 
arbitration. Clarification can come in the form of prioritizing 
the most important factors or highlighting those factors that 
typically receive more weight. The more information the 
parties possess as to how an arbitrator will decide, the more 
likely they are to find a middle ground. 
Clarifying the weight of each factor would be especially 
beneficial for conflicting factors. For example, MLB could note 
that a player’s performance over the course of his career is 
more important than his performance in the most recent 
season. However, the specific order in which the factors are 
 
 131. This exclusion is likely a result of a collective bargaining agreement being 
constructed between the Players’ Association, big-market owners, and small-market 
owners. The big-market owners and small-market owners split the owners’ vote, while 
the Players’ Association prefers that a team’s financial position be excluded.   
TULIS_FORMATTED 1/19/2010  3:45 PM 
128 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 20.1 
prioritized is irrelevant. All that matters is that the parties 
are aware of how an arbitrator will view the factor and, as a 
result, have one less factor to interpret allowing the parties to 
avoid pre-hearing disagreement. Another weight issue 
surrounding conflicting factors is a municipality’s ability to 
pay weighed against the wages of comparable workers in 
other municipalities. A statute could indicate how to weigh 
these factors. For example, a statute could require an 
arbitrator to prioritize a municipality’s ability to pay the 
wages of comparable employees in comparable municipalities 
if the cited municipalities have greater financial resources 
than the negotiating municipality. 
Another option is New Jersey’s requirement that an 
arbitrator discuss, in his decision, how much weight was 
given to each relevant factor. This would allow the parties in 
subsequent arbitrations to predict how that arbitrator will 
weigh a given factor by analyzing past analogous arbitrations. 
Since the parties would be able to better predict how the 
arbitrator might decide, they would be more likely to find a 
middle ground – at least if the arbitrator were identified in 
advance. Two risks are associated with written decisions in 
final-offer arbitration. First, these decisions are not always 
consistent. The arbitrator often attempts to be fair and not 
offend either party, resulting in decisions that may simply 
pay lip service to the criteria. Having parties rely on such 
decisions may be dangerous and there is no guarantee that 
parties will gain a greater understanding of how the 
arbitrator will adjudicate. The other risk of allowing 
arbitrator discussion, however, is that it increases the 
potential for judicial review, thus reducing the efficiency and 
finality of the process. New Jersey public employment 
arbitrations, presumably because of this discussion 
requirement, have been the subject of greater judicial review 
than those of Wisconsin and Michigan.  
3. How Extensive and Detailed Should Criteria Be? 
The ideal list of criteria in final-offer arbitration is short 
and very detailed. Although a state may find twenty factors to 
be absolutely essential for mimicking the market, final-offer 
arbitration typically works best when parties negotiate based 
on a short list of factors. Additionally, regardless of how many 
factors are included in the statute or agreement, each factor 
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should be as detailed as possible to limit arbitrator discretion 
so that the parties can more easily predict the outcome of an 
arbitration proceeding. Many factors in both state statutes 
and MLB’s collective bargaining agreement are relatively 
vague. Ambiguous factors are left open to interpretation by 
the arbitrator and, more importantly, by the negotiating 
parties. Each negotiating party will interpret a vague factor 
in their favor, which could “chill” negotiations. 
For example, in MLB, there is little guidance as to how to 
apply the comparability factor. While MLB salary arbitration 
is effective in reaching pre-hearing settlement, the resulting 
salaries may be skewed by the criteria in the collective 
bargaining agreement. I propose a formula based on MLB’s 
salary comparability factor that would provide greater 
specificity and understanding among the parties prior to 
arbitration.132 The formula determines a player’s market 
value based on the player’s position, performance, and other 
factors. If the parties knew that an arbitrator would take this 
“market value” into account, this knowledge could further 
negotiations. The formula is an example of the benefits of 
greater specificity, which, in any form, would lead to a better 
understanding between the parties and, in turn, direct the 
parties toward the final-offer goal of pre-hearing settlement.  
Greater specificity would function in a fashion similar to New 
Jersey’s 1995 clarification of the “financial” position factor. 
 
 132. The formula standardizes each factor by providing constants based on the 
“superstar” statistics of a player in a given six hundred at bats. “Superstar” statistics 
were the league leaders in any given category spread out over 600 at bats. For hitters, 
the factors included are hits, home runs, total bases, RBI’s, stolen bases, runs, walks, 
time on the disabled list, team wins, errors (at the player’s position), Stolen Bases 
allowed (for catchers), caught stealing (for catchers, the formula also included other 
position specific categories such as outfield assists), experience, and other factors. 
(There are obviously different factors for starting pitchers and relief pitchers).  
  One side of the formula included the constants and the statistics of 
“comparable” players spread out to six hundred at bats while the other side of the 
formula included the constants and the statistics of the arbitration eligible player 
spread out to six hundred at bats (Note: six hundred at bats is the standard for hitters. 
There are different (innings-related) standards for starting pitchers and relief pitchers). 
Both of these are put in the denominator while the comparable player’s salary is put in 
the numerator and the arbitration eligible player’s market value, X, is placed in the 
other numerator. This allows you to compare the value of the player going through 
arbitration with any “comparable” player a party chooses to utilize.  Of course, MLB 
salary arbitration is a successful example of final-offer arbitration but there is always 
room for improvement. I may discuss the formula more thoroughly in an upcoming 
article.  
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Michigan, Maine, and Wisconsin, on the other hand, have left 
their financial position language vague, much like New 
Jersey’s pre-1995 language. Greater specificity for this 
criterion, and all criteria for that matter, would better 
facilitate good faith bargaining. 
Along the same lines, catch-all factors such as those 
included in Michigan, Maine, and Wisconsin’s statutes most 
likely do not suit the goals of final-offer arbitration. In 
negotiations, parties may attempt to stretch the reach of a 
catch-all definition to a point where the parties disagree as to 
what is relevant. To avoid this scenario, an arbitrator should 
be restricted to a set number of criteria. 
Criteria should be as clear as possible to facilitate pre-
hearing negotiations while reflecting the sought-after market. 
It is most important that criteria be detailed in such a 
manner that the parties have a mutual understanding as to 
how a given criterion will be applied prior to the hearing. If 
possible, a list of criteria should be limited, detailed, and 
include some mechanism for apportioning the weight of 
conflicting factors. 
CONCLUSION 
When applied appropriately, final-offer arbitration can be 
a useful tool for facilitating pre-hearing settlement.  In 
addition to MLB and public employment, there are various 
contexts that could benefit from the process, including private 
value disputes and interest arbitrations under the proposed 
Employee Free Choice Act. Within these contexts, any 
agreement to arbitrate can be implemented in such a way as 
to promote the theories behind final-offer arbitration, most 
importantly by counteracting the “chilled” bargaining effect 
associated with conventional arbitration. Outlining a suitable 
set of criteria and choosing the appropriate procedural 
variation may ensure proper implementation. Although final-
offer arbitration appears to be underutilized and, at times, 
misused, if applied properly in an appropriate context, it can 
be a valuable alternative to conventional arbitration and 
provide a more efficient, congenial and cost-effective 
arbitration process. 
 
 
